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1. Introduction 
Antidumping and countervailing duty (AD and CVD) regimes have long been an 
important channel for import protection in the United States, the European Union, 
Canada, and Australia. With the rising importance of regional trade agreements, and 
the role of the GATT/WTO in limiting the scope for increases in most-favored 
nation (MFN) tariffs, AD duties have become increasingly important instruments for 
developing countries as well.  
The theoretical literature on the political economy determinants of import protection 
(Hillman, 1982 and 1989; Findlay and Wellisz, 1982; Mayer, 1984; Hillman and 
Usprung, 1988; and Grossman and Helpman, 1994 and, 1996) suggests a number of 
political factors that may help explain the pattern of import protection. There is 
strong evidence from the U.S. and EU that the application of administered 
protection is indeed influenced by such political factors. This comes from a number 
of empirical studies which, following the seminal article by Finger et al. (1982), 
estimate logit or probit models of the outcome of investigations. Thus, Finger et al. 
(1982) and Eymann and Schuknecht (1993) find that the likelihood of positive AD 
decisions increases with the size of the complaining industry in terms of employment 
or output for the U.S. and the EU, respectively. A similar result is obtained by 
Baldwin and Steagall (1993), though only for CVD cases in the U.S. Baldwin and 
Steagall’s study also suggests that injury findings in U.S. AD and CVD cases are more 
likely, the less the complaining industry is ‘competitive’ internationally (as measured 
by the import penetration ratio). Tharakan and Waelbroeck (1994) find that in the 
EU concentrated industries have a greater chance of success when filing AD 
complaints. Finally, Czinkota and Kotabe (1997) show that the U.S. International 
Trade Commission (ITC) supports both sunset industries and relatively concentrated 
industries with stable or growing markets. 
The empirical literature on AD and CVD regimes has focused almost exclusively on 
the U.S., the EU and a few other traditional AD users. Since the 1980s, however, 
there has been a rapid spread of AD regimes to middle- and low-income countries. 
More than 60 countries have adopted AD rules in the last two decades (Zanardi, 
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2002). This process accelerated with the implementation of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements that formed the World Trade Organization. The result is that AD and 
CVD regulations are now a feature of many WTO Member trade regimes. Since the 
early 1990s, middle- and low-income countries as a group—led by India, South 
Africa, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico—have overtaken the major traditional users in 
terms of total number of AD investigations.1  
In this paper we extend the literature in terms of both country coverage and the set 
of political and protection indicators. We examine the influence of politics in one of 
the more enthusiastic new AD regimes, the one in Mexico. This country adopted its 
AD law in the mid-1980s, at the same time that it joined the GATT and 
implemented a radical policy shift from import substitution to trade liberalization. A 
first close look at AD policy practice in Mexico reveals that investigations—
undertaken by the International Trade Practices Unit, part of the Ministry of the 
Economy—may well have been influenced by political factors. Like elsewhere, the 
demand for AD protection in Mexico goes up during macroeconomic downturns 
(see Francois and Niels, 2003). In the 1990s there were waves of antidumping actions 
against China—targeting 44% of total imports from that country across a large 
number of very broad product categories—and against steel imports from a large 
number of different countries. The database we use for this paper—described in 
more detail below—shows that the success rate of complaints is relatively high—
67%, compared to a global average of 56% (Zanardi, 2002)—in particular for 
investigations involving the EU, East Asia, steel imports and the constructed value 
methodology. Duties tend to be significant (50% ad valorem on average excluding 
China, and 253% on average for China).2  
In order to test the influence of political factors more formally we consider two 
categories of potential explanatory variables that may influence the outcome of AD 
investigations. Both categories can be conceptually mapped to the marginal costs and 
benefits to administrative authorities of supplying import protection. The first are 
country-specific factors that relate to the characteristics of the countries targeted in 
                                                 
1 Historical data on AD usage by country is provided in Nagaoka (1996), Miranda et al. (1998) and 
Zanardi (2002). 
2 See Niels and Ten Kate (forthcoming) for a descriptive overview of AD policy in Mexico. 
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the investigation (often referred to as the named countries). The second category 
consists of industry-specific factors. We assess whether complaining industries with 
certain characteristics have a greater chance of success than industries that do not 
share these characteristics. This stands in contrast to the related political economy 
literature on trade policy, which is focused more on industry-specific factors than on 
country-specific factors. This is because this literature is mainly concerned with 
traditional tariff and non-tariff protection that ostensibly applies across imports from 
all countries, whereas AD (and other forms of contingent protection) is country-
specific. Finally, a number of time-related explanatory variables are also examined. 
While there are similarities between the approach in this paper and that followed by 
Finger et al. (1982) and the subsequent literature, our empirical approach also differs 
in three important ways. First, we do not make an explicit distinction between 
political and ‘technical track’ variables, beyond the use of constructed value (a 
technical factor) and the role of regime shift in 1993. In part this is because further 
technical data are not systematically available from the published decisions in the 
Mexican Official Journal. Additionally, some technical variables can also be easily 
interpreted in political terms. For example, the Tharakan and Waelbroeck (1993) 
study on the EU includes a technical variable indicating whether the investigation is 
against a centrally planned economy. Such investigations allow authorities a high 
degree of discretion when selecting substitute countries or when constructing the 
‘fair’ value, which can be as much political as technical. Our results here for the 
Mexican use of the ‘constructed value’ methodology also support the notion that it is 
political factors that matter at the margin (as discussed further below). At the same 
time, we identify a shift in the entire Mexican regime post-1993 (a change in technical 
mechanisms) that has yielded a greater overall supply of antidumping protection. A 
second difference with the Finger et al. type of approach is that we do not model 
dumping and injury findings separately. Such separation makes sense for bifurcated 
systems such as the U.S., where the Department of Commerce and the ITC decide 
on dumping and injury, respectively, but less so for Mexico where the same authority 
decides on both aspects. If political factors play a role, they may be expected to do so 
at either stage of the investigation. Finally, a third difference is that we examine the 
level of the duty actually imposed, in addition to a logit specification where the 
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outcome of the investigation is the dichotomous dependent variable. We depart from 
much of the literature in this respect, which is focused on the dichotomous outcome 
of investigations. Our emphasis on the actual level of protection supplied more 
closely maps to the more recent theoretical literature on the political economy of 
trade policy, as discussed below. 
2. Economic and Political Indicators 
We have constructed a database of AD investigations in Mexico from 1987, when 
the first investigations were initiated, to 2000.3 The relevant variables for the present 
exercise are summarized in Table 1. The database builds heavily on one developed by 
the Directorate General for Economic Studies of the Mexican Federal Competition 
Commission, called SIAM.4 SIAM summarizes the information on all AD and CVD 
decisions published by the antidumping authority in the Mexican Official Journal. For a 
typical investigation, the authority publishes three different decisions, announcing, 
respectively, the initiation of the investigation, the preliminary duties (if any), and the 
final outcome. Where an investigation covers multiple named countries we consider 
each named country as a separate case. For practical reasons we do not make further 
separations for investigations involving multiple exporting firms or multiple products 
(since some cases target several or very broad tariff classes). Our sample consists of 
167 AD investigations initiated from 1987 to 2000.5  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The outcome of each AD investigation is specified as the dichotomous dependent 
variable in a logit model (called OUTCOME). This variable takes the value of 1 for 
cases resulting in a measure—ie, a duty or undertaking—and the value of 0 in case of 
a negative outcome. Of the 167 investigations in the sample, 113 resulted in a 
                                                 
3 These data are available on request, and can be downloaded as well from the internet (see reference 
in footnote on title page).  
4 SIAM stands for Sistema de Información sobre Acciones antidumping y antisubvenciones de México 
(Information System on AD and CVD Actions in Mexico). 
5 Towards the end of this period there were five other investigations of which the outcome was as yet 
unknown at the time of the analysis. These have not been included. It should also be noted that our 
paper is only concerned with AD investigations. Between 1987 and 2000 there were 18 CVD 
investigations in Mexico as well. 
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measure and 54 had a negative outcome.6 Hence, the total number of observations 
for OUTCOME is 167. In our alternative specification the level of the ad valorem AD 
duty imposed is the dependent variable (called DUTY). We only have 120 
observations for this variable, namely 66 cases for which we know the level of duty 
and the 54 cases with a negative outcome (and corresponding duty level of zero).7 
The other 47 were cases where the measure was either an undertaking, a volume-
based duty or not specified in the published decision. It should be noted that the 
empirical literature on antidumping is focused almost exclusively on the dichotomous 
outcome of investigations. In part, this is because data on the level of protection are 
not as readily available as data on affirmative and negative determinations. However, 
the theoretical literature is more focused on the level of protection itself. Therefore, 
while we follow the empirical literature and explore the dichotomous outcome of 
investigations, we also follow the theoretical literature and explore the level of 
protection supplied through the antidumping channel. 
The literature on the political economy determinants of import protection highlights 
a number of factors that may explain the pattern of administered protection. This 
guides our selection of variables. The political support and electoral competition 
approaches (Hillman, 1982; Grossman and Helpman, 1994 and 1996) both stress the 
government’s trade-off between general welfare, and the potential contributions that 
follow from assisting specific industries. With competing lobbyist and electoral 
competition models, the relative concentration of industries may also play a role 
(Findlay and Wellisz, 1982; Grossman and Helpman, 1994 and 1996). In all of these 
frameworks, as well as Mayer’s (1984) median voter model, the relative size of an 
industry should be positively linked with import protection, while the import 
elasticity of demand is inversely linked to protection. In the lobbying literature, 
factors that, at the margin, shift the government’s relative valuation of industry 
profits and welfare may also shift the equilibrium supply of protection. The exact 
components of the marginal cost of protection (for an optimizing government) will 
vary depending on the underlying political model, the importance government places 
                                                 
6 Within OUTCOME we do not distinguish between duties and undertakings because the latter were 
only imposed in six cases. 
7 In some cases the authority has imposed different levels of duty to different exporting firms from 
the named country. In those cases we have taken the highest as the DUTY observation. 
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on overall welfare, and the broader institutional context in which the losers from any 
import protection can make their pain felt by the government making the decision.  
Following Helpman’s (1997) stylized characterization of this literature, our variables 
can be broadly grouped into those that indicate a higher marginal cost to providing 
protection on the one hand (country-specific trading partner variables in the present 
case), and those that reflect higher marginal benefits from providing protection to 
industry (industry-specific variables). Some of our industry variables also map to a 
world-view of competing lobbies of varying size and power (industry 
size/concentration). 
The first country-specific explanatory variable (XSHARE) relates to the importance 
of the named country as a destination for Mexican exports, as measured by the share 
of total Mexican exports going to that country in the year the complaint was filed. 
The hypothesis is that Mexico’s trade authorities may be less tough on a country that 
is an important export destination for Mexican companies, so as not to disturb trade 
relations or perhaps for fear of retaliatory measures. Hence, because the costs of 
protection should map directly to this variable, a negative relationship is expected 
with our left-hand variable.8 Yearly data on country shares of Mexican exports were 
taken from various issues of the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. 
The second country-specific variable (PTA) is a dummy variable reflecting whether 
the named country had signed a preferential trade agreement with Mexico at the time 
of the decision (in which case PTA is equal to 1). Again, as this may indicate a 
relatively higher marginal cost of providing protection, a negative relationship with 
OUTCOME is expected. The hypothesis is that the trade authorities may not wish to 
disturb trade relations with partners to an agreement by pursuing AD cases 
aggressively. However, there may be two alternative, and less political, explanations 
for the impact of trade agreements. One is that dumping occurs less frequently 
within free trade areas, because exporters’ home markets are no longer sheltered 
(making price differentials more difficult to sustain). The other is that agreements 
                                                 
8 The same variable is analysed by Finger et al. (1982) and Tharakan and Waelbroeck (1994) for the 
U.S. and EU, respectively, although neither of these studies finds a statistically significant relationship 
with the outcome of the investigation. 
  7
such as NAFTA lead to increased foreign direct investment, and hence increased 
intra-firm trade, within the region, and dumping is less likely to occur (or be noticed) 
in intra-firm trade.9 Nevertheless, both explanations would be expected to have more 
of an impact on the total number of AD complaints (ie, the demand for protection) 
rather than on the outcome of investigations (the supply of protection). In total, PTA 
is equal to 1 in 29 cases. Table 2 gives an overview of the preferential trade 
agreements Mexico has in place, and the number of AD decisions against other 
parties to the agreements since the date these agreements came into force. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The third country-specific variable (WTO) is determined by whether the named 
country was a member of the WTO or a signatory country to its predecessor, the 
GATT, at the time of the decision. WTO is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for 
members and 0 for non-members.10 A negative relation is expected, under the 
hypothesis that non-members are less able to impose political costs following duties, 
so that they are more vulnerable to discretionary use of the AD rules. In contrast, 
signatories are (at least to some extent) protected from such discretion by the 
GATT/WTO framework. Indeed, Blonigen and Bown (2001) find that the U.S. 
antidumping authorities’ decisions are influenced by the threat of foreign retaliation 
under the GATT/WTO dispute mechanism. A total of 42 investigations in our 
model involved non-members. 
In several of these cases, especially against China and former USSR states, the named 
countries were considered non-market economies. AD investigations against such 
countries often use the constructed value methodology to determine the ‘fair value’, 
which tends to increase the chance of a positive finding (in Mexico the success rate 
in AD investigations using the constructed value was 77% on average). In order to 
assess whether any WTO effect may be explained by the use of the constructed value 
                                                 
9 In this respect, a study by Waldkirch (2003) demonstrates that foreign direct investment into Mexico 
has indeed increased under NAFTA, and that this increase is mainly due to the NAFTA partners, 
rather than from countries outside the agreement. A number of empirical studies on tariff protection 
in general also find some evidence that industries engaging in more intra-industry trade tend to receive 
less protection. See, for example, Marvel and Ray (1987). 
10 The date of entry into GATT or the WTO of each member state can be found at www.wto.org. 
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approach, a dummy variable (CVAL) is tested separately for the latter—taking a 
value of 1 if constructed value was used (in 43 investigations). It should be noted that 
CVAL and WTO are not highly correlated—the correlation coefficient is –0.20. This 
is because, first, the constructed value approach has been used in a number of 
investigations against GATT/WTO members as well (specifically, against Brazil, 
Malaysia, South Korea, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and the U.S.), and, 
second, in 24 of the 43 cases against non-GATT/WTO signatories the Mexican 
authorities in fact did not use the constructed value approach (comparing third-
country export prices instead). 
The last country-specific variable is a dummy variable that reflects whether the target 
country itself had taken any AD action against Mexican exports. This variable tests 
the sometimes-heard allegation that AD actions can provoke retaliatory (‘tit-for-tat’) 
AD actions by the target country and thus trigger trade wars.11 Again, this can be 
viewed as a measure of the potential political cost of imposing import protection. 
Two alternative specifications are considered. The first (TFTAT_INV) equals 1 for 
AD investigations that were opened within 12 months after the target country had 
opened an AD investigation against Mexico, and 0 otherwise. The second 
specification (TFTAT_MEA) reflects whether the target country had imposed an 
AD measure against any Mexican exports in the 12 months before the outcome of 
the case.12 Data on AD actions against Mexico from 1986 to 2000 were provided by 
the Rules Division of the WTO Secretariat. In 51 out of the 167 cases the target 
country had opened an AD investigation against Mexico, and in 29 cases it had 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that the model only considers antidumping measures against Mexico. Other types 
of protection measures (for example, under the safeguard rules or for environmental reasons) might 
equally trigger AD retaliation but are not included in the analysis. 
12 Several variations to these specifications have also been tested, but are not reported here. These are 
all combinations of the following options: (i) whether the target country had opened an investigation 
(as for TFTAT_INV) or imposed a measure (as for TFTAT_MEA) against Mexico; (ii) whether this 
action by the named country was against the complaining industry specifically or against any Mexican 
industry (TFTAT_INV and TFTAT_MEA both consider actions against any industry); (iii) whether 
this action took place in the period of time before the start of the investigation (as for TFTAT_INV) 
or before the outcome of the investigation (as for TFTAT_MEA); and (iv) whether the period 
considered is 12 months, two years or three years. The time period considered is essentially arbitrary. 
Twelve months, which is taken for both TFTAT_INV and TFTAT_MEA, seems a reasonable 
timeframe within which to undertake retaliatory action. In contrast, in an empirical analysis of AD 
retaliation world-wide, Prusa and Skeath (2001) consider two time periods, one of three years, and one 
actually covering any time in the past. Both time periods arguably seem quite long to detect any 
retaliatory motives. 
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imposed an AD measure against Mexico. A breakdown of these cases by target 
country is reported in Table 3. 
[Table 3 about here] 
A potential problem with the country-specific analysis is that the variables reflecting 
export share (XSHARE), preferential trade agreements (PTA) and retaliation 
(TFTAT_INV and TFTAT_MEA) are all dominated by the United States. The U.S. 
is where most Mexican exports go to and where most AD actions are take against 
them, while most of the Mexican investigations that took place under a preferential 
trade agreement were against the U.S. under NAFTA (see Table 2). Table 4 shows 
that correlation between these variables is reasonably high.  
[Table 4 about here] 
The first of our industry-specific variables (PTYPE) is also a measure of the potential 
political cost of imposing protection. This is a dummy variable distinguishing 
between imports of final consumer goods (a value of 1) and imports of intermediate 
or capital goods (a value of 0). The hypothesis—also tested by Czinkota and Kotabe 
(1997) for the U.S.13—is that industrial users of imported intermediate or capital 
goods have greater scope to oppose AD measures than final consumers affected by 
such measures. An empirical study by Marvel and Ray (1983) on protection more 
generally finds such a relationship as well. A total of 36 out of 167 investigations in 
our model involved consumer goods. 
The next two industry-specific variables measure the relative size of the complaining 
industry. LSHARE represents the share of the industry in total national employment 
in the year of the filing. YSHARE gives the share in GDP. As in some of the other 
studies referred to above, these variables are included to test the hypothesis common 
to the entire political economy literature that the size of the industry is an important 
factor directly linked to equilibrium protection. 
                                                 
13 These authors reject the hypothesis, actually finding a statistically significant effect opposite to the 
one expected. 
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Employment and output data at the four-digit industrial classification level are taken 
from the last three issues of the Industrial Census (Censo Industrial), undertaken by 
the National Statistics and Geography Institute (INEGI). The Industrial Census 
forms part of the wider Economic Census held every five years; most recently in 
1989, 1994 and 1999. This source is preferable to INEGI’s Monthly Surveys which 
present the same type of information and are more up-to-date, but have a much 
narrower coverage. LSHARE and YSHARE are expressed in percentages of 
national totals rather than in absolute levels. The coverage of the Industrial Census is 
not 100%, so it seems more adequate to relate each four-digit industry figure to the 
total given in the same Census series. Figures for investigations initiated from 1987 
to 1990 are taken from the 1989 Census (which gives data for 1988), figures for 
1991–1995 from the 1994 Census (1993 data), and figures for 1996–2000 from the 
1989 Census (1998 data). 
The fourth industry-specific variable (FSIZE) represents the average firm size in the 
complaining industry, measured in number of employees. The hypothesis is that large 
firms generally have greater political clout and may thus be favored in AD decisions. 
Following some of the results in the political economy of protection literature, we are 
interested in whether the more organized industries (in terms of ability to lobby) tend 
to receive greater protection. Figures on average firm size at the four-digit industry 
level are also obtained from the Industrial Census (by dividing employment in the 
industry by number of ‘economic units’ in the industry, as reported in the Census). 
While LSHARE, YSHARE and FSIZE are each measures of industry size, they are 
not highly correlated (the only reasonably high correlation coefficient, 0.55, is 
between YSHARE and FSIZE).  
The fifth industry-specific variable (MSHARE) reflects the importance of the 
allegedly dumped product relative to total Mexican imports. At the start of each 
investigation, the Mexican authority normally identifies the eight-digit import tariff 
class or classes under consideration (though some investigations have a very broad 
scope and cover tariff classes at the four-digit level). MSHARE gives the total 
imports for these tariff classes (from both targeted and other countries) in the year of 
the filing as a percentage of total Mexican imports. The data comes from a database 
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called MAGIC (Module to Analyze the Growth of International Commerce), owned 
by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
What is our expectation about the relationship between import share and outcome of 
the investigation? We remain agnostic. On the one hand, larger imports could be 
considered a signal that the domestic industry is subject to stronger international 
competition, which might make the authorities more willing to give AD protection as 
the marginal benefits may then be larger. This result is found in the Baldwin and 
Steagall (1993) study referred to in the introduction. Empirical work on general trade 
protection by Treffler (1993) also finds that industries that experience an increase in 
import penetration receive more protection. On the other hand, the Grossman–
Helpman (1994) theoretical framework predicts that industries whose domestic 
output is high relative to imports receive greater protection (unless import demand is 
highly elastic). Higher important penetration may also mean that the foreign lobby 
has become more established, raising the political cost of protection (hence also 
implying an expected negative sign for the MSHARE coefficient).14 
Finally, two additional control variables (DRER and DUM93) are included in the 
model. Both capture effects over time, which may be of relevance given that the 
success rate of AD complaints in Mexico has fluctuated over the years (see Figure 1). 
DRER measures the change in the real exchange rate of the peso in the six months 
before the decision is published. The model assesses whether macro-economic 
conditions—specifically appreciations or depreciations of the currency—affect the 
outcome of investigations. For example, an appreciation of the peso may increase the 
likelihood of an injury finding (in this respect DRER may also be interpreted as a 
‘technical track’ variable). Such conditions do appear to influence the number of AD 
complaints (see Francois and Niels, 2003). Exchange-rate data are taken from the 
Mexican Central Bank (Banco de México). DUM93 is a dummy variable that takes on 
the value of 1 for cases initiated from 1993 onwards. This is to control for a possible 
structural shift in the antidumping authority’s ‘aggressiveness’ in this period, not 
explained by any of the other independent variables, as suggested by Figure 1. One 
explanation for such a shift could be that in 1993 the AD rules were tightened in the 
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form of a new law and regulations, and the International Trade Practices Unit was 
created.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
3. Econometric Results  
We first employ a logit model to explore the relationship between the investigation 
outcome variable and the other variables described above. This estimation equation 
takes the following form: 
OUTCOME i = a1XSHARE i + a 2PTA i + a 3WTO i + a 4CVAL i
+a 5TFTAT i + a 6PTYPE + a 7LSHARE i
+a 8FSIZE i + a 9 MSHARE i +
+a10DRER i + a11DUM 93 i + e i
 
(1) 
where c is a constant term, e an error term, and the other variables are explained 
above and in Table 1. Our second estimation equation involves the actual level of 
import protection supplied. Equation (2) is estimated using iterative feasible 
generalized least squared (GLS), and takes a form similar to equation (1).15 
DUTY i = a1XSHARE i + a 2PTA i + a 3WTO i + a 4CVAL i
+a 5TFTAT i + a 6PTYPE + a 7LSHARE i
+a 8FSIZE i + a 9 MSHARE i +
+a10DRER i + a11DUM 93 i + e i
 
(2) 
As mentioned above, our sample has 167 observations. However, several 
observations are ultimately excluded in various specifications for two reasons. First, 
several targeted products (for example, pencils, toys or prams) fall into very broad 
                                                                                                                                     
14 A number of recent empirical studies on the political economy of trade protection try to assess the 
influence of foreign lobbies on U.S. trade policy. See Gawande and Krishna (2003, pp. 230–231). 
15 Note that our estimating equations do not include an intercept term.  In terms of underlying theory, 
this simply means that sectors with no imports and with firms characterized by zero employees and 
zero output do not benefit from sector-specific contingent import protection.  Formal specification 
tests strongly support this specification. 
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industrial classifications, such as ‘other manufactured products’, so that most of the 
industry-specific independent variables available to us become meaningless because 
of aggregation problems. Second, a number of investigations are targeted at very 
broad product categories that encompass several industrial or import tariff classes, 
again rendering some of the industry-specific variables meaningless. 
The first column of Table 5 presents the results of our estimation of equation (1), 
with OUTCOME as the dependent variable. The other two columns in the table 
show the results for equation (2), where DUTY is the dependent variable. The first 
set of results for equation (2) is estimated for the full sample of antidumping cases, 
while the second set of results, in the last column, corresponds to estimates for the 
sample of affirmative determinations only. Note that each of the three specifications 
is statistically significant overall at the 0.01% level. 
[Table 5 about here] 
From Table 5 it follows that the estimated coefficient for WTO—which reflects 
membership of the GATT/WTO—has the expected sign and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in each specification. To give an idea of the economic (as 
opposed to statistical) impact of this variable, consider that the inverse of the odds-
ratio in column (1) implies that investigations against non-members are 13 times 
more likely to result in duties or undertakings than investigations against members of 
the GATT/WTO. From the second two columns it follows that GATT/WTO 
members also receive lower duties. The coefficient in the second column, –0.404, 
suggests that duties are on average one-third lower (following the Halvorsen–
Palmquist method for interpreting dummy variables in semi-logarithmic equations). 
Table 5 also indicates that this WTO effect cannot be explained by the use of the 
constructed value method. The correlation coefficient for WTO and CVAL is –0.20 
while the estimated coefficient for CVAL in Table 5 is statistically insignificant for 
both the outcome of investigations and the level of duties subsequently applied. This 
is not surprising if we take a political economy rather than a technical view of the 
investigation process. The technical reading of constructed value in the literature is 
that by construction it always leads to a higher duty. This does not appear to be the 
case here. Rather, the level of protection is not sensitive to the technical variable 
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itself but to the political context of its application. If we view constructed value as 
just one of many technical options available for making a political decision through 
this administrative channel, this simply supports the notion that the process is more 
political than technical. Critically, WTO membership does appear to increase the 
cost-side of the political equation for setting industry protection through this 
channel.  
The coefficients for both XSHARE and PTA turn out to be statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, the hypothesis that countries that are important trading 
partners to Mexico receive more favorable treatment must be rejected. In the context 
of the political economy literature, export market share and preferential 
arrangements seem to have at best a negligible role in assessment of the costs of 
supplying protection. 
As to retaliation, TFTAT_INV produces more significant results than 
TFTAT_MEA for the outcome of investigations although only at the 10% level, as 
shown in column (1) of Table 5. The reported odds-ratio means that possibly 
retaliatory AD investigations—ie, those that were initiated within 12 months after the 
target country started an AD investigation against Mexico—are three times as likely 
to result in a positive outcome. However, while this matters for the finding of 
dumping, it appears to be irrelevant for the actual level of protection supplied. 
The consumer- or producer-good split is significant at the 5% level in all three 
columns. Whether the investigated imports are producer or consumer goods does 
indeed have an impact on the observed outcome. Working from the odds ratio in the 
first column, investigations concerning final consumer goods are 4.5 times more 
likely to result in duties or undertakings than investigations concerning intermediate 
or capital goods. The coefficient in the second column, 0.28, suggests that duties on 
final consumer goods are 32% higher than those on producer goods. Again, this is 
consistent with the results of both the competing lobbies and electoral competition 
literature. It is also consistent with Marvel and Ray’s (1987) results for the United 
States. It confirms the notion that industrial consumers are generally better able to 
organize against protection than are final goods consumers.  
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Of the measures of the complaining industry’s relative size and political clout, only 
the one related to average firm size turns out to be significant across all three 
columns. This fits the competing lobbies view of the protection process, but does 
not fit the general role assigned to industry size in the theoretical literature. The share 
in employment and share in output (LSHARE and YSHARE) variables have 
statistically insignificant coefficients for the dichotomous outcome of investigations, 
and for the overall level of protection supplied (including failed and successful 
petitions). However, for the subset of cases where a duty has actually been imposed, 
we do find a significant role for the employment variable. The results are thus mixed. 
The general result in the literature that the importance of the industry in terms of 
employment or production is a determinant of protection does not seem to carry 
into the factors actually taken into account by the Mexican antidumping authority 
when deciding whether to impose duties. Yet, when duties are imposed, this does 
play a role. We then find a statistically significant and positive coefficient for the 
LSHARE variable as shown in column (3), which suggests industries that are large 
employers tend to receive higher levels of protection when protection is actually 
supplied (the YSHARE coefficient is significant at the 10% level but does not have 
the correct sign). This finding is again consistent with the political support, electoral 
competition and median voter approaches familiar from the political economy theory 
of trade protection. 
Average firm size in the complaining industry does influence the outcome. The 
estimated coefficient for FSIZE is statistically significant at the 5% level in all 
columns. The positive sign of the coefficient indicates that industries dominated by 
larger firms are better able to secure protection. This is consistent with the 
Grossman-Helpman (1996) model, when firms target their own protection only and 
not the economy-wide pattern of protection. It is also consistent with the Findlay 
and Wellisz (1982) representation of competing lobbies. 
The coefficient for MSHARE—the share of the investigated product in total 
Mexican imports, is statistically insignificant with respect to the dichotomous 
outcome of investigations, but significant with respect to the level of protection 
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actually supplied. The tariff results are in line with  Treffler (1993) and suggest that 
industries subject to greater import competition receive higher levels of protection. 
Finally, changes in the real exchange rate have no impact on AD decisions, while the 
dummy variable for 1993 onwards does turn out to be of relevance. The dummy 
variable for 1993 has a statistically significant coefficient at the 1% or 5% level in all 
three columns. The odds-ratio in column 1 implies that investigations from 1993 
onwards were just over three times more likely to result in duties and undertakings, a 
structural shift not explained by any of the other variables. The other columns 
suggest that the resulting duties have also been significantly higher (roughly 30%–
40% higher on average). As discussed above, the shift may be attributed to the new 
legal framework for AD that came into force in 1993, which appears to have 
channeled more protection through this mechanism. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
Mexico is an example of an emerging economy that has embraced open, rules-based 
trade, while at the same time becoming a heavy user of AD laws. The recent political 
economy literature suggests that the outcome of the application of AD rules should 
be linked to political factors affecting both the costs of providing protection (at least 
as viewed by the administering authority) and factors linked to the benefits of 
providing protection (again as viewed by that same authority). Like the traditional 
developed country users of administered protection, our results suggest that Mexico 
has indeed used its AD regime to supply protection for political reasons along the 
lines pointed to in the recent theoretical literature. 
AD investigations against countries that are outside the GATT/WTO system are 
much more likely to result in duties or undertakings than investigations against 
members. Non-members are more vulnerable to discretionary use of the AD rules, 
and are often assessed as non-market economies or under the constructed value 
methodology. This implies that WTO membership of trading partners does 
effectively increase the political costs of administered protection. We also find 
limited evidence for retaliatory motives, with investigations that were initiated within 
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12 months after the target country had opened an investigation against Mexico being 
three times as likely to result in a positive outcome.  
As to industry-specific factors, we find that the Mexican antidumping authority treats 
industries dominated by large firms more favorably, presumably because these 
industries have greater political clout or are better able to focus their lobbying efforts. 
When we focus on the level of imposed duties, we find limited evidence that industry 
size as measured by employment matters as well, as predicted in most political 
economy models. Another finding is that investigations concerning final consumer 
goods are much more likely to result in duties or undertakings than investigations 
concerning intermediate or capital goods. Actual duties also tend to be higher for 
consumer good industries. This suggests that industrial users of imported 
intermediate or capital goods have greater scope to oppose AD measures than final 
consumers, again supporting the notion of competing interest groups of varying 
degrees of concentration, with industrial consumers being better organized than final 
consumers. 
Overall, Mexico’s AD policy practice, like that in the U.S. and the EU, is dominated 
by political influence on the level of protection provided. Whether the same applies 
for the many other new AD regimes in middle- and low-income countries is 
something the empirical literature needs to explore further.  
 
  18
References 
Baldwin, R.E., and Steagall, J.W. (1993), ‘An Analysis of Factors Influencing ITC 
Decisions in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Cases’, 
NBER Working Paper 4282. 
Blonigen, B.A., and Bown, C.P. (2001), ‘Antidumping and Retaliation Threats’, Paper 
for the European Trade Study Group Annual Conference, Brussels, 
September 14th–16th. 
Czinkota, M.R., and Kotabe, M. (1997), ‘A Marketing Perspective of the U.S. 
International Trade Commission’s Antidumping Actions; An Empirical 
Inquiry’, Journal of World Business, Vol. 32, pp. 169–187. 
Eymann, A., and Schuknecht, L. (1993), ‘Antidumping Enforcement in the European 
Community’, in: J.M. Finger (ed.), Antidumping: How it Works and Who Gets 
Hurt, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Findlay, R. and Wellisz, S. (1982), ‘Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of 
Trade Restrictions, and Welfare’, in J. Bhagwati (ed.), Import Competition and 
Response, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Finger, J.M., Hall, H.K., and Nelson, D.R. (1982), ‘The Political Economy of 
Administered Protection’, American Economic Review, Vol. 72, pp. 452–466. 
Francois, J. and Niels, G. (2003), ‘Business Cycles, the Current Account, and 
Administered Protection in Mexico’ CEPR Discussion Paper 3981. 
Gawande, K., and Krishna, P. (2003), ‘The Political Economy of Trade Policy: 
Empirical Approaches’, in: E.K. Choi and J. Harrigan (eds.), Handbook of 
International Trade, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Grossman, G.M and E. Helpman (1994), ‘Protection for Sale’, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 84, No. 4, pp. 833–850. 
  19
Grossman, G.M and E. Helpman (1996), ‘Electoral Competition and Special Interest 
Politics’, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 63, pp. 269–286. 
Helpman, E. (1997), ‘Politics and Trade Policy’, in: D. Kreps and K.F. Wallis (eds.), 
Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hillman, A.L. (1982), ‘Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist 
Motives’, American Economic Review, Vol. 72, No. 5, pp. 1180–1187. 
Hillman, A.L. (1989), The Political Economy of Protection, Chur: Harwood. 
Hillman, A.L. and Usprung, H.W. (1988), ‘Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and 
International Trade Policy’, American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, pp. 729–
745. 
Hosmer, D.W., and Lemeshow, S. (1980), ‘A Goodness-of-fit Test for the Multiple 
Logistic Regression Model, Communications in Statistics, Vol. 10, pp. 1043–
1069. 
Marvel, H.P. and Ray, E.J. (1983), ‘The Kennedy Round: Evidence on the Regulation 
of Trade in the U.S.’, American Economic Review, Vol. 73, pp. 190–197. 
Marvel, H.P. and Ray, E.J. (1987), ‘Intra-industry Trade: Sources and Effects of 
Protection’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 95, pp. 1278–1291. 
Mayer, W. (1984), ‘Endogenous Tariff Formation’. American Economic Review, Vol. 74, 
No. 4, pp. 970–985. 
Miranda, J., Torres, R.A., and Ruiz, M. (1998), ‘The International Use of 
Antidumping 1987–1997’, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 32, pp. 5–71. 
  20
Nagaoka, S. (1996), ‘Antidumping Policy and Competition’, Private Sector 
Development Department Occasional Paper 13 (Washington DC: World 
Bank). 
Niels, G., and Ten Kate, A. (forthcoming), ‘Antidumping Protection in a Liberalising 
Country: Mexico’s Antidumping Policy and Practice’, World Economy, 
[forthcoming in 2004]. 
Prusa, T.J., and Skeath, S. (2001), ‘The Economic and Strategic Motives for 
Antidumping Filings’, NBER Working Paper 8424. 
Tharakan, P.K.M., and Waelbroeck, J. (1994), ‘Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Decisions in the E.C. and in the U.S.; An Experiment in Comparative 
Political Economy’, European Economic Review, Vol. 38, pp. 171–193. 
Treffler, D. (1993), ‘Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection’, 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101, pp. 138–160. 
Waldkirch, A. (2003), ‘The ‘New Regionalism’ and Foreign Direct Investment: The 
Case of Mexico’, Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, June, 
pp. 151–184. 
Zanardi, M. (2002), ‘Antidumping: What Are the Numbers?’, Paper for the European 
Trade Study Group Annual Conference, Kiel, September 13th–15th. 
  21
Table 1:  Description of the variables included in the regression models 
Variable Description Data source Characteristics Expected 
sign 
Dependent     
OUTCOME Outcome of the 
investigation (negative=0; 
affirmative =1) 
Own database built 
from several issues of 
the Diario Oficial 
Dichotomous 
54 x 0; 113 x 1 
 
DUTY Measure of the ad valorem 
duty t, and equal to ln(T) 
where T=1+t 
Own database built 
from several issues of 
the Diario Oficial 
Linear  
Mean=62.2; 
St.dev=135.3 
 
Country-specific 
explanatory 
variables 
    
XSHARE Share of total Mexican 
exports in year of 
complaint 
IMF Direction of Trade 
Statistics Yearbook 
Linear (0%–100%) 
Mean=26.4; 
St.dev=36.8 
– 
PTA Preferential trade 
agreement with Mexico 
(no=0; yes=1) 
Ministry of the 
Economy 
Dichotomous 
138 x 0; 29 x 1 
– 
WTO GATT/WTO member 
(no=0; yes=1) 
WTO website Dichotomous 
42 x 0; 125 x 1 
– 
CVAL Constructed value 
approach used (no=0; 
yes=1) 
Own database built 
from several issues of 
the Diario Oficial 
Dichotomous 
124 x 0; 43 x 1 
+ 
TFTAT_INV Antidumping investigation 
against Mexico in year 
before initiation (no=0; 
yes=1) 
WTO Secretariat, 
Rules Division 
Dichotomous 
126 x 0; 51 x 1 
+ 
TFTAT_MEA Antidumping measure 
against Mexico in year 
before decision (no=0; 
yes=1) 
WTO Secretariat, 
Rules Division 
Dichotomous 
138 x 0; 29 x 1 
+ 
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Table 1 continued:  
Description of the variables included in the regression models 
 
Industry-specific 
explanatory 
variables 
    
PTYPE Whether dumped product 
is intermediate good (0) or 
final consumer good (1) 
Own database built 
from several issues of 
the Diario Oficial 
Dichotomous 
131 x 0; 36 x 1 
+ 
LSHARE Share in total employment 
in Mexico 
Last three issues of 
INEGI Industrial 
Census 
Linear (0%–100%) 
Mean=2.00; 
St.dev=1.34 
+ 
YSHARE Share in total output in 
Mexico 
Last three issues of 
INEGI Industrial 
Census 
Linear (0%–100%) 
Mean=3.29; 
St.dev=1.45 
+ 
FSIZE Log of the average firm 
size (number of 
employees) 
Last three issues of 
INEGI Industrial 
Census 
Linear  
Mean=4.182; 
St.dev=0.954 
+ 
MSHARE Share of tariff class of 
dumped product in total 
Mexican imports in year of 
complaint 
Module to Analyze the 
Growth of 
International 
Commerce (database 
owned by UN 
ECLAC) 
Linear (0%–100%) 
Mean=0.09; 
St.dev=0.19 
? 
Time-related 
explanatory 
variables 
    
DRER Change in real exchange 
rate in six months before 
decision (positive value 
means appreciation of the 
peso) 
Banco de México, 
Indicadores Económicos y 
Financieros 
Linear (%) 
Mean=2.9; 
St.dev=7.3 
+ 
DUM93 Investigation initiated 
before (0) and after (1) 
January 1st 1993 
 Dichotomous 
78 x 0; 89 x 1 
+ 
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Table 2:  Mexico’s preferential trade agreements 
Signatory countries Start date Number of antidumping 
decisions since start date 
(up to December 2000) 
Chile January 1st 1992 1 
USA and Canada (NAFTA) January 1st 1994 25 
Colombia and Venezuela 
(G3) 
January 1st 1995 3 
Costa Rica January 1st 1995 0 
Bolivia January 1st 1995 0 
Nicaragua July 1st 1998 0 
EU July 2nd 2000 0 
Israel July 2nd 2000 0 
Guatemala, El Salvador and 
Honduras (Northern 
Triangle) 
March 15th 2001 n.a. 
EFTA July 1st 2001 n.a. 
Note: Data on trade agreements provided by the Mexican Ministry of the Economy. 
 
Table 3:  Mexican antidumping cases with possible retaliatory motives1 
Target country Number of cases where target 
had opened AD investigation 
against Mexico in previous 12 
months—TFTAT_INV (% of all 
cases against that target) 
Number of cases where target 
had imposed AD measure against 
Mexico in previous 12 months —
TFTAT_MEA (% of all cases 
against that target) 
USA 41 (75%) 24 (44%) 
EU (and member states)2 4 (24%) 3 (18%) 
Brazil 4 (21%) 2 (11%) 
Argentina 1 (100%) 0 
Colombia 1 (33%) 0 
Total (all target countries) 51 (30%) 29 (17%) 
Note: 1 Data on AD cases against Mexico provided by the WTO Rules Secretariat. 2 The European 
Commission applies the antidumping rules for the EU as a whole, and member states do not have 
their own antidumping laws. Therefore, the dummy variable is set equal to 1 for cases where the 
European Commission, rather than the individual member state concerned, had taken action against 
Mexico (even if the Mexican action is against that member state only). 
 
Table 4:  Correlation matrix for the export share, preferential trade  
agreement and retaliation variables 
 
Variable XSHARE PTA TFTAT_INV TFTAT_MEA 
XSHARE 1.00 0.48 0.67 0.49 
PTA 0.48 1.00 0.24 0.23 
TFTAT_INV 0.67 0.24 1.00 0.58 
TFTAT_MEA 0.49 0.23 0.58 1.00 
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Table 5:  Regression results for outcome of antidumping 
   investigations with OUTCOME or DUTY as dependent 
variable 
Explanatory 
variable 
(1): LOGIT model of 
the outcome (either 
affirmative or negative) 
of investigations 
(2): GLS estimates for 
ln(T) for full sample 
(3):GLS estimates for 
ln(T) for affirmative 
determinations only 
XSHARE 0.992 
–(1.02) 
–1.514E-4 
–(0.11) 
2.920E-4 
(0.01) 
 
PTA 0.458 
–(1.05) 
–0.100 
–(0.95) 
–0.020 
–(0.14) 
 
WTO 0.075 
–(3.34)*** 
–0.404 
–(4.92)*** 
–0.249 
–(2.33)** 
 
CVAL 1.031 
(0.06) 
–0.091 
–(1.17) 
–0.077 
–(0.72) 
 
TFTAT_INV 2.962 
(1.70)* 
0.085 
(0.37) 
0.014 
(0.10) 
 
TFTAT_MEA 1.025 
(0.04) 
–0.074 
–(0.67) 
–0.121 
–(0.70) 
 
PTYPE 4.534 
(2.172)** 
0.280 
(3.11)** 
0.242 
(1.98)** 
 
LSHARE 0.865 
–(0.79) 
0.049 
(1.71) 
0.112 
(3.05)** 
 
YSHARE 0.934 
–(0.37) 
–0.041 
–(1.34) 
–0.104 
–(1.64)* 
 
Ln(FSIZE) 2.030 
(2.83)** 
0.101 
(3.06)** 
0.141 
(2.38)** 
 
MSHARE 0.305 
–(1.07) 
0.486 
(2.80)** 
0.432 
(2.26)** 
 
DRER 1.047 
(1.36) 
0.004 
(0.89) 
–0.001 
–(0.28) 
 
DUM93 3.173 
(2.01)** 
0.317 
(4.07)*** 
0.266 
(2.23)** 
 
 
observations 142 100 58 
R-squared  0.7058 0.8273 
Log likelihood –70.1   
Chi-squared 37.3 (Wald) 
(p = 0.0004)*** 
239.94 
(p = 0.0000)*** 
277.84 
(p = 0.0000)*** 
 
Note: Logit regression for the binary variable OUTCOME with 142 included observations in 
specification (1) and iterative feasible generalized least squares estimates for 100 observations in 
specification (2) and 58 observations in specification (3). Estimated odds-ratios are shown for the logit 
model and estimated coefficients are shown for GLS models, both with z-statistic in parenthesis. *** 
means odds ratio or coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level; ** means significant at 5% level; * 
means significant at 10% level.  
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Figure 1:  ‘Success rate’ of antidumping investigations 1987–2000  
(% of cases initiated each year resulting in duties or 
undertakings) 
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Note: The years in the figure refer to the year of initiation of the investigation. The outcome of the 
investigation is sometimes published up to two years later. World-wide success rate taken from 
Zanardi (2002, Table 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
